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Although baseline data for post-conflict situations are frequently unavailable, there is a 
clear deterioration in the health conditions of populations during and following conflict. 
Excess mortality and morbidity, displaced populations, and vulnerability to 
communicable diseases during and following conflict all call for immediate relief and 
restoration of basic services. As much as possible, short-term relief and assistance 
programmes should be implemented in a manner compatible with longer term health 
system rehabilitation.  
 
This paper presents a framework for analyzing the inputs and policies that make up 
post-conflict rehabilitation programmes in the health sector. Post-conflict …/ 
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rehabilitation of the health sector can be viewed as three inter-related approaches: (1) an 
initial response to immediate health needs; (2) the restoration or establishment of a 
package of essential health services; and (3) rehabilitation of the health system itself. 
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1 Introduction 
Armed conflict is an unfortunately common reality in modern times. In the past twenty-
five years, more than fifty countries have experienced conflict. The countries afflicted 
are disproportionately poor—fifteen of the twenty poorest countries in the world had 
conflict in the last two decades of the twentieth century (World Bank 1998). By the year 
2020, mortality and morbidity from war are expected to represent the eighth largest 
category of disease burden worldwide (Krug et al. 2000).  
 
The concentration of contemporary conflicts in resource-poor countries presents the 
international community with a considerable challenge in approaching post-conflict 
reconstruction. Most contemporary wars are intra-state rather than international; many 
have inflicted large numbers of civilian casualties. In Croatia in 1991 and 1992, 
civilians accounted for nearly two-thirds of the registered deaths from the conflict 
(Kuzman et al. 1993).  
 
In addition to direct casualties, armed conflicts negatively affect public health through 
several distinct channels. In poor states, military spending comes at the expense of 
social and health expenditures. Foreign investment and economic growth are among the 
first victims of armed conflict. Moreover, responding to the trauma caused by armed 
conflict takes priority over promoting long-term economic and social development. The 
World Bank (1998) has estimated that during the 1990s a greater amount of 
international resources went to relief efforts than to ongoing development programmes. 
In Rwanda, the three-month genocide in 1994 and its aftermath carried a financial price 
tag worth ten years of development assistance, without counting the enormous human 
toll of that conflict. 
 
Post-conflict reconstruction is the process that ‘supports the transition from conflict to 
peace in an affected country through the rebuilding of the socioeconomic framework of 
the society’ (World Bank 1998). Ideally, post-conflict reconstruction should extend 
beyond the reconstruction of physical infrastructure; it should set the conditions for a 
functional and sustainable peace.  
 
In addition to disproportionately affecting resource-poor countries, conflicts pose other 
challenges inherent in the rehabilitation process. One relates to the issue of legitimacy 
and political decision-making: Who has the authority to set priorities and make 
decisions? Who controls the resources? Coordinated timing and allocation of available 
resources are important to both the long-term sustainability and political feasibility of 
rehabilitation efforts. Donors, international organizations, and post-conflict 
governments often have varying agendas that require reconciliation (Macrae 1997).  
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These challenges often exist in a broader context of constitutional weakness; the 
concentration of wealth and power in the hands of a military and political elite (Cox 
2001); powerful warlords and continued criminal activity (Zwi et al. 1999); and the 
residual conditions of war—including black markets and organized crime (Cox 2001). 
These problems, which exist generally in post-conflict situations, particularly affect 
rehabilitation in the health sector. Health systems are heavily dependent on the broader 
macroeconomic picture in terms of revenue, sector expenditures, and the prioritization 
of policies.  
 
This paper will explore the complexities of the relationship between conflicts and 
health—specifically what is involved in reconstructing health systems in the post-
conflict period. Most armed conflicts generate major public health consequences, both 
in terms of the population’s health status and the structure, policies, and financing of the 
health system. The paper begins by addressing these consequences, and then presents a 
framework for analyzing the inputs and policies that make up post-conflict 
reconstruction programmes in the health sector. The effects of public health 
reconstruction are influenced by the level of pre-conflict infrastructure and health 
system development, and also depend heavily on the greater context of economic and 
political rehabilitation. The paper analyzes the experiences of different countries that 
have undergone conflict—including several that are still experiencing the negative 
effects of conflict—and concludes with lessons learned from this comparative analysis.  
2  The negative effects of conflict 
2.1  Effects on public health 
The consequences of conflict on the health of populations are vast. In addition to the 
direct effects of war, there are a range of adverse outcomes through intermediate 
effects—including the destruction of infrastructure, equipment, and supplies; and the 
interruption of essential services. In many cases, conflict exacerbates poor health 
conditions present before the conflict. 
 
The direct effects of conflict include mortality and morbidity resulting form conflict, 
including injuries caused by landmines, which are pervasive in contemporary conflicts. 
Negative health effects are both physical and emotional, often resulting in permanent or 
long-term disability. Another indirect effect of conflict on public health results from 
population displacement. Displaced populations are particularly susceptible to 
communicable diseases—including respiratory infections, malaria, and measles. Other 
population groups especially vulnerable to the indirect effects of conflict are those who 
have chronic diseases and experience prolonged periods without treatment, and those 
who were already affected by food insecurity, nutritional deficiencies, and high fertility 
rates prior to the onset of conflict. 
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Conflict destroys infrastructure and necessary supplies and equipment: thus, the 
delivery of preventive and curative health services are often interrupted. Ruptures in the 
supply of clean water and breakdowns in sanitation systems result in an increase in 
preventable communicable diseases such diarrhoea, malaria, and tuberculosis. 
Vaccination campaigns, micronutrient supplementation programmes, and other public 
health efforts are neglected or abandoned. Additionally, although the phenomenon is not 
well documented, post-conflict settings are high-risk situations for the transmission of 
HIV/AIDS—with highly mobile populations and an increase in the sex-trade as a form 
of employment. 
 
Health indicators from Mozambique help to illustrate the devastating effects of 
prolonged conflict on public health. The country experienced ongoing civil war from 
1975 to 1991 (see Appendix). The under-five mortality rate peaked at 473 per 1,000 in 
1986. Following the intervention of the International Red Cross Committee (ICRC), 
which introduced vaccines and vitamin A supplementation programmes, and other 
groups in 1991 the rate dropped to 269 per 1,000—still extraordinarily high (Keane 
1996). In 1985, only 45 per cent of pregnant women had a prenatal consultation; in 
1988 only 25 per cent of women gave birth outside of the home. In 1990 just 20 per cent 
of the urban water system was purified. Nor was there significant improvement in the 
immediate post-conflict period. In 1995, four years following the end of the conflict, the 
under-five mortality rate had actually increased to 270 per 1,000 (Keane 1996). 
 
Sierra Leone provides a similar example. In 1999, the time of the official declaration of 
the end of war, the population’s health ranked among the worst in the world. Infant and 
under-five mortality rates stood at 170 and 286 per 1,000 live births, respectively. The 
maternal mortality rate was 1,800 per 100,000 births—one of the worst in the world 
(World Bank 2002). The diseases most affecting the population—malaria, tuberculosis, 
acute respiratory infections, diarrhoea, cholera, and other water-borne diseases—all 
have cost-effective cures and preventions. But these have not been widely applied in 
Sierra Leone because of a lack of financial, infrastructure, and human resources, weak 
capacity in the health sector, and residual insecurity that renders parts of the country 
inaccessible. 
 
In Afghanistan in 2001, only one-third of the health districts had reproductive health 
services; just 15 per cent of deliveries were attended by a trained health care worker 
(Cook 2003). Half the children under five years of age were stunted or chronically 
malnourished, and nearly one- quarter of Afghan children were dying before reaching 
the age of five from preventable diseases including acute respiratory infections and 
diarrhoea (Waldman and Hanif 2002). The maternal mortality rate was 1,700 per 
100,000 births; 40 per cent of deaths in women were attributed to maternal causes 
(Cook 2003). 
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Although baseline data for post-conflict situations are frequently unavailable, there is a 
clear deterioration in the health conditions of populations during and following conflict. 
The excess mortality and morbidity, and vulnerability to communicable diseases during 
and following conflict, necessitate immediate relief and restoration of basic services. 
But the rehabilitation of the health system must also address underlying problems of 
destroyed or damaged infrastructure and interruption of services so that the restoration 
of basic health care is efficient and equitable in the medium and long-term as well.  
2.2  Effects on health systems 
Health systems—as defined by the World Health Organization (WHO)—comprise the 
organizations, institutions, and resources that are involved in actions to improve health 
(WHO 2000). All three components of the health system—organizations, institutions, 
and resources—are likely to be negatively affected by conflict and the political 
instability that surrounds and follows it. Typically, the management of health service 
organizations becomes more centralized and characterized by vertical programmes; 
community-based programmes are likely to be neglected. Disease surveillance often 
suffers during conflicts, resulting in uninformed prioritization. Data are limited; services 
fragmented; and qualified managers hard to find within the public health system. There 
is limited data availability for decision-making, fragmentation, and a lack of training in 
management positions (Zwi et al. 1999). 
 
These problems are aggravated by limited resource availability—manifest in at least 
four different ways. The first is financial—resulting from increased military 
expenditures, reduction in government revenues, an inability to generate significant new 
revenue, and an increasing dependence on aid. During El Salvador’s civil war—from 
1980 to 1992—per-capita health expenditures decreased by 50 per cent. While conflicts 
impose financial constraints on health systems, in post-conflict situations deteriorated or 
destroyed health systems infrastructure requires substantial capital investment. 
 
A second area of limited resource availability is human resources. Some trained health 
professionals and management staff are kidnapped or killed during conflicts. Others 
have fled; among those remaining in their positions many have experienced disrupted 
training and are underpaid or not at all. Of the 160 physicians working in East Timor 
prior to the 1999 referendum, only 20-30 remained after the ensuing violence (World 
Bank 2000).  
 
Third, much of the service delivery infrastructure itself—health care clinics, health 
centres, and hospitals—is destroyed during chronic conflicts or is subverted to military 
or political use and is no longer functional for health care delivery (Zwi et al. 1999). In 
East Timor, as of January 2000, only 23 per cent of the health facilities remained 
undamaged (World Bank 2000). 
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During the internal insurgency in Mozambique, from 1981-92, the National Health 
Service became a military target during an escalation in the conflict between 1982 and 
1985, particularly in its most vulnerable rural areas (Pavignani and Colombo 2001). 
Fifty per cent of the health infrastructure in Mozambique was completely destroyed 
during the conflict; the remaining facilities were in need of repairs and equipment and 
had limited coverage (Keane 1996). 
 
Finally, policy-making structures themselves are severely weakened by conflict and 
instability—creating a vacuum of authority and a lack of legitimacy in health systems 
decision-making. There is a resulting lack of institutional memory, further complicated 
by the exodus of policymakers, academics, and other necessary actors in health policy. 
Underlying these institutional weaknesses, there is generally a sense of torn social 
networks and a lack of trust. The cumulative effect of these impacts fundamentally 
changes the nature of health service delivery in post-conflict situations. Primary care 
delivery typically suffers the most; remaining service delivery capacity is likely to be at 
the secondary and tertiary level, principally in urban settings. Utilization of health 
services is negatively affected by a fear of violence, curfews, corruption, and informal 
payments to health workers. While NGOs continue to deliver health services in specific 
geographic areas, healthcare service delivery in post-conflict situations is often reduced 
to a patchwork of programmes and services offered through different channels. With 
NGOs and donors operating on separate agendas and timelines, the resource flows 
themselves can be difficult to track (Zwi et al. 1999). 
 
During nearly 20 years of conflict in Uganda, the national health policy process 
practically came to a halt. When the National Resistance Movement (NRM) gained 
power in 1986, there was a general breakdown in public institutions in general and a 
leadership vacuum in the health system—particularly related to primary care and health 
financing. Vertical projects cropped up in this vacuum, operating separately from the 
government and focusing more on infrastructure reconstruction than on sustainable 
health promotion programmes. These developments ultimately undermined the capacity 
of the Ugandan government to run its own health system, and created inefficiencies in 
the healthcare delivery (Macrae et al. 1996). 
3  A framework for post-conflict health systems rehabilitation 
Every post-conflict situation is unique, and appropriate inputs and policies for 
reconstructing health systems vary accordingly. This section of the paper seeks to 
identify common factors across countries—in terms of the inputs necessary to make 
crippled health systems function and the policies necessary to make health systems 
function effectively, equitably, and in a sustainable manner. As a first step in identifying 
these common factors, we propose the following framework as a basis for analyzing the 
rehabilitation of health systems in post-conflict situations (Figure 1). 
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The national political and economic framework provides the immediate context—in 
terms of the pre-conflict health system, the conflict itself, and post-conflict 
rehabilitation. But in modern conflicts, the ensuing relief efforts and rehabilitation are 
typically strongly influenced by a wider international context beyond the national 
environment—this context is portrayed in Figure 1 by the ‘Donors’ oval surrounding the 
national environment. This supranational level provides a variety of influences on, 
policies for, and inputs into rehabilitation. 
 
Post-conflict rehabilitation of the health sector can be viewed in three parts: (1) an 
initial response to immediate health needs; (2) the restoration or establishment of a 
package of essential health services; and (3) rehabilitation of the health system itself. 
The critical point, however, is that these three phases are not isolated from each other; 
the manner in which the immediate humanitarian needs are met can have profound 
implications for fostering sustainability. Where possible, the three parts should operate 
synergistically and as part of a continuum.  
 
Addressing the immediate health needs of displaced and distressed population groups is 
the first step in rehabilitation. Successful humanitarian and relief efforts for healthcare 
in post-conflict areas have included the following elements: basic and emergency 
curative health services; obstetric services; communicable disease control; 
immunizations; and supplementary feeding programmes. Relief efforts can also install 
important elements of future health system functions—including health information 
systems; and chronic disease preparedness (Toole 2000).   7
Responding to immediate health needs requires urgent action and quick, tangible inputs. 
From a humanitarian standpoint, these are necessary to restore basic health services and 
reduce excess mortality and morbidity. In some cases, this immediate response is among 
the first manifestations of the restoration of peace and normalcy. However, 
incorporating a fast-track response to address immediate needs into a systematic 
medium and long-term response is essential for the successful reconstruction of the 
national health system. The fast-track response should address relief issues remaining 
from the conflict stage while simultaneously anticipating future policies and 
programmes that will move towards the principle objectives of all health systems—
efficiency, equity, and positive population health outcomes. 
 
In Mozambique, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) developed 
decentralized Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) to assist in the resettlement of displaced 
persons and to meet their health needs. In at least one province, Zambezia, the QIPs 
focused more on investments in capital infrastructure than on the development of 
sustainable health resources. Additionally, the projects did not take into account 
changes in health needs as populations shifted and displaced persons returned to their 
homes (Keane 1996). 
 
Following the relief phase, most health sector rehabilitation efforts have moved to 
restore the systematic delivery of essential health services. These efforts have focused 
on a package of cost-effective interventions. In Mozambique, for example, priority 
services implemented following the end of conflict were the Expanded Programme on 
Immunization (EPI) for children under five years of age, tetanus immunization for 
pregnant women, vitamin A supplementation for high-risk populations, deworming for 
children, and initial health education campaigns (Keane 1996). In East Timor, initial 
priorities were in food security, water and sanitation, immunizations, obstetric services, 
and disease surveillance. In Afghanistan, the concept of a basic health services package 
(BHSP) has played a central role in plans for post-conflict health reconstruction—an 
effort to restore services that in some areas have not been available for more than a 
decade.1 
 
Ideally, the implementation of a basic package of health services should be 
accompanied by additional components of a comprehensive approach to health systems 
rehabilitation—in which essential health services are restored and resources are also 
directed towards medium and long-term needs in the areas of management, financing, 
and health policy. Most post-conflict countries have this intention, and have added 
                                                 
1 The BHSP in Afghanistan includes: maternal and newborn health; traditional birth attendants (TBAs); 
additional emergency obstetric services; child health and immunizations; nutritional supplements 
including vitamin A, folic acid, and iron; growth monitoring; supplementary feeding programmes; 
communicable disease control, including bednets for malaria prevention; community health workers 
trained in the diagnosis and treatment of common conditions; mental health treatment; and a defined set 
of essential drugs (Waldman and Hanif 2002).   8
management and capacity-building elements to initial rehabilitation projects. Sierra 
Leone’s initial health sector reconstruction project involved two components: (1) the 
restoration of essential health services in four designated priority districts at an 
estimated cost of $15.2 million; and (2) development of public and private sector 
capacities—through district team strengthening, support to the Health ministry, and 
promotion of civil society participation—at an estimated cost of nearly $6 million 
(World Bank 2002). Similarly, in East Timor in 2000, the UN Transitional Authority 
(UNTAET) established the Interim Health Authority to design and lead a health sector 
rehabilitation and development programme. The objectives of Phase I of this 
programme were to restore access of basic services to the entire population and to begin 
to develop health policy and systems for the future. Phase II, beginning in 2001, was 
designed to support ongoing health services, focus on equality, and more clearly 
develop policy guidelines, administrative systems, and regulations (Tulloch et al. 2003). 
 
Croatia, as part of a health sector rehabilitation project supported by the World Bank, 
initiated a project with five different components, totalling nearly $40 million. The first 
component was an investment in health care delivery—both primary and hospital 
services—with a focus on restructuring and rationing acute, outpatient, and 
complementary care. The second component was in public health –including 
programmes for health monitoring and programme evaluation, national health 
promotion, and media advocacy—particularly for the prevention of cardiovascular 
disease, particularly prevalent in Croatia. The third component, pharmaceutical waste 
disposal, addressed the issue of pharmaceutical remnants from the war and selected 
specific sites for disposal. The fourth and fifth components, entitled System Wide 
Initiatives and Project Management, supported the first three components and served as 
the basis for strengthening management and regulation in the health system, and for 
evaluation and monitoring of the project itself (World Bank 1999). 
4 Inputs 
The framework for post-conflict rehabilitation of the health sector described in Figure 1 
illustrates the importance of meeting immediate health needs by restoring basic health 
services while also planning for the medium and long-term development of the health 
system itself. Two overarching factors feed into the rehabilitation of health systems—
(1) financial, human and physical inputs; and (2) policy issues. Key inputs include 
financing, human resources, physical infrastructure, information systems, and essential 
drugs. These inputs can be inherited from the pre-conflict health system, donated by 
international actors, or generated from within the country.  
4.1 Financial  resources 
Extraordinary financial resources are required to rebuild health systems, particularly 
when the health sector was chronically under-funded before and during the conflict. In 
post-conflict situations, expenditures on infrastructure, equipment, and other capital   9
costs initially absorb much of the financial resources. But recurrent expenditures are 
also needed for the sustainable financing for the health system. Inevitably, initial 
investment and recurrent expenditures will exceed the capacity of national sources; even 
in the long-term many governments are unable to finance and provide basic health 
services to their entire population. It is important that the government does assume as 
much of these expenditures as possible, early on, to ensure sustainability and ownership. 
In many situations, this is a difficult or impossible goal. For example, as of 1999 
Mozambique continued to experience considerable dependence on external financing. 
The National Health Service relied on outside aid for 50 per cent of its recurrent 
expenditures and 90 per cent of capital expenditures (Pavignani and Durao 1999). 
 
What does health system rehabilitation cost? In Sierra Leone, the 2001 Health Sector 
Reconstruction and Development Project was designed to re-establish the provision of 
health services while simultaneously improving sector capacity through the 
decentralization of decision-making and improvements in management capabilities 
(World Bank 2002). The first component of the project—to restore essential health 
services in four priority districts and support key programmes in malaria, tuberculosis, 
and sanitation—had an estimated cost of $15 million. The second component—
designed to develop both public and private health sector capacity—received almost $6 
million to be used to strengthen planning, evaluation, and implementation by district 
team; develop the Health ministry’s abilities in the areas of management, budgeting, and 
financing; and improve human resource development and civil society participation. 
Together, the two components of the project cost $21.2 million (Table 1). In a country 
with an estimated population of 5.7 million (CIA 2003a), this is equivalent to $3.70 per 
resident. 
 
Table 1: Financing of the Sierra Leone Health Sector Reconstruction 
and Development Project  
Local Foreign Total
Goods 1.9 5.1 7.0
Works 4.5 0.0 4.5
Services 2.9 0.5 3.3
Training 1.2 0.2 1.5
Operational Costs 3.3 0.0 3.3
Unallocated 1.5 0.0 1.5




Source: World Bank (2002). 
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By contrast, the estimated cost of Afghanistan’s BHSP and hospital care for five years, 
beginning in 2002, will be between $230 and $310 million in addition to $100 million 
for necessary health infrastructure. The World Bank has estimated that to effectively 
provide the minimum package of health care to the full population of 22 million will 
require $2.2 billion over ten years—or $10 per person per year (UNDP 2002). The total 
estimated cost for the Health System Project in Croatia at the time the loan was 
approved was $39.8 million—or $9 per resident (CIA 2003b). Of this amount, $14.9 
million was from the Croatian government and the remainder from foreign assistance 
(World Bank 1999). 
4.2 Human  resources 
The interruption of normal health services before and during conflicts has tremendous 
effects on the human resource capacity of the health sector. In East Timor, only 20-30 
of the 160 doctors working in the country before the conflict remained afterwards 
(World Bank 2000). Inputs into human resources should take into account training 
needs at different levels, management skills, sufficient compensation to draw qualified 
personnel to the public sector, and hardship compensation for personnel relocating to 
rural, disadvantaged, and dangerous areas. Human resources are a key input into health 
systems rehabilitation—shifting health personnel towards primary care and preventive 
medicine, and from urban to rural areas, can mitigate the persistent inequities generated 
by the pre-conflict health system and exacerbated by the conflict. 
4.3 Other  inputs 
Physical infrastructure—including health posts, health centres, hospitals, and 
accompanying equipment—is a critical component for the successful functioning of all 
health systems. In post-conflict situations, the physical infrastructure of the health 
system is often badly damaged and in need of reinvestment. As a result, nearly all of the 
reconstruction projects reviewed in this paper include a component for the physical 
rehabilitation of buildings and for re-equipping health facilities. 
 
Rehabilitating a health system following conflict also requires current information to 
guide the prioritization and policy decisions. An effective health information system is 
critical. The period immediately following a peace agreement generally requires an 
enormous amount of information concerning the status of the health system and 
population health indicators. Accurate baseline data will help in prioritizing resource 
allocation and guiding policy-making. As a post-conflict country transitions from 
restoring essential health services to health system rehabilitation, the health information 
system continues to play an essential role in planning and prioritization, and also attracts 
and coordinates external assistance. Another key input to the health sector rehabilitation 
is a functioning drug supply system, including an essential drug list and systems for 
procurement, supply, evidence-based prescribing, and quality monitoring.   11
5 Policy  issues 
The framework in Figure 1 lays out the principal policy issues related to rehabilitation 
of the health system. These include: coordination among donors; political commitment 
by host governments; partnerships with NGOs; planning, prioritization, and integration 
of health services; and the sustainability of the rehabilitation effort. Each of these issues 
is described in this section of the paper. In addition, the context in which health policy is 
developed is critical:  factors such as the quality of the technical analysis that informs 
decision-making; the capacity and motivation of government bureaucracy; and the 
influence of international donors on governments (Grindle and Thomas 1991). 
 
Kosovo provides an illustration of a positive context for policy development. In 1999 a 
policy team produced a ‘Proposed Strategy for the Future Development of Health 
Services in Kosovo’ after a series of consultation meetings and gathering information 
from all factions. The next step was the formation of policy working group—including 
WHO staff, the Director of the Institute of Public Health, and the Dean of the Medical 
College—who in turn engaged other leaders in the sector and across Serbia to develop 
the health policy guidelines. The main principles of the guidelines were: decentralized 
primary care; family medicine teams; a referral system for specialist care; using 
population density and geographical indicators as bases for decisions about health 
facility placement; not expanding services and recurrent expenditures beyond the future 
capabilities of Kosovo; predominantly public provision with improved private sector 
regulations; an essential drugs programme and corresponding evidence-based 
prescribing; and a health system that would not discriminate based on ethnicity (Shuey 
et al. 2003).  
 
Similarly, Croatia, in preparation for its Health System Project (HSP), developed an 
inventory and categorization of health facilities, facility planning and service 
rationalization guidelines, an accreditation system for providers and facilities, and 
clinical and pharmaceutical protocols for a national health information system. Once 
implemented, the HSP went on to develop new policy options in the areas of insurance 
arrangements, provider payment mechanisms, and alternative revenue sources (World 
Bank 1999).  
5.1 Donor  coordination 
The 1990s witnessed a manifestation of international interest in post-conflict 
reconstruction and the coordination and rationalization of donor inputs in post-conflict 
settings. Multilateral donors became actively involved in the field; among other 
developments, the World Bank formed a post-conflict unit (Lanjouw et al. 1998). The 
issue of donor coordination and the role of international assistance in assisting countries 
in the transition into the post-conflict rehabilitation were central in these discussions. 
International donors with specific agendas can potentially undermine the cohesiveness 
of a national health policy. The growth in sheer numbers and variety of international   12
agencies working in the health sector, as well as their rapid entry into and exit from 
post-conflict situations have fuelled a move towards greater coordination of donor 
inputs. 
 
Many influential decisions in health systems rehabilitation take place outside the 
country in question, at the headquarters of multilateral and bilateral organizations. The 
vagueness of political authority, questions of legitimacy, and the limited capacity of a 
new government present make it difficult to coordinate external assistance so that it 
corresponds to the national health priorities and a coordinated policy strategy. The 
health sector presents a particular challenge in this sense because of the urgency of 
the needs in the sector, its humanitarian appeal to the international community, and the 
complex channels and competing interests of assistance to sector (Lanjouw et al. 1998). 
 
Immediately following the peace agreement there is typically a rush of NGOs, and 
multinational or bilateral organizations to provide humanitarian relief and alleviate 
human suffering—critical functions in the absence of a working health system. The 
quandary that follows lies in the implications of this inflow for the future development 
and sustainability of a national health policy strategy. Maximizing the volume of 
external resources initially may come at the expense of a coherent and coordinated 
effort within a national health system strategy (Buse and Walt 1997). As the country 
moves from conflict toward development, there is not necessarily a corresponding shift 
in efforts by the international actors, who may continue to operate in a relief mode with 
short-term objectives.  
 
In addition to disjointed timelines, a lack of donor coordination affects the human 
resource capacity of the health system. Host government officials may be distracted by 
the competing projects and needs of different donors (ibid.). Also, qualified health care 
personnel move from the public sector to the NGO or private sector, where the 
compensation is likely to be better. Despite these inherent challenges—which are 
present in general in development assistance to health sectors but are particularly acute 
in post-conflict situations—there are important factors that can facilitate the 
coordination of external assistance. Fundamental among these is the role of the existing 
health authority, whether it is the health ministry or an interim health authority. A strong 
leadership role, together with internal coordination, demonstrates the credibility desired 
by donor agencies and lays the ground for long-term, mutually agreed-upon plans. A 
second critical element for effective donor coordination is the sharing of credible and 
accessible information among and between the international actors and the existing 
health authority (Pavignani and Durao 1999). 
 
The rehabilitation of the East Timor health system from 1999 to 2001 illustrates many 
of the challenges common to post-conflict health sector rehabilitation—including 
competing objectives and expectations of donors, stakeholders, and politicians. In East 
Timor, there were discrepancies in the priorities, timelines, and reporting formats   13
among organizations. International organizations bid against each other for qualified 
personnel, who were often recruited from local organizations (see Appendix). Despite 
these challenges, East Timor has realized considerable achievements in restoring its 
health system.  
 
Coordination of donors’ inputs can occur in different formats—sharing information; 
seeking outside expertise as to appropriate inputs; or jointly managing inputs and 
processes (Walt et al. 1999). Moving from project-based assistance—characterized by 
the quick disbursement of large amounts of money to a particular project—to sector-
based aid is an important step to maximize external assistance without jeopardizing an 
evolving national health system strategy. Sector-based aid generally involves an 
agreement between donors and the existing health authority based on shared analysis, 
conditionalities, and priorities (Buse and Walt 1997). 
 
There have been different formalized approaches to aid coordination—including sector-
wide approach mechanisms (SWAps) and performance-based partnership agreements 
(PPAs). SWAps pool donor funds, which are then used by the government according to 
agreed strategies and priorities. The advantage of SWAps is that the decision-making 
authority is transferred to the host government, promoting a more cohesive and 
sustainable national health system. The weakness of SWAps in post-conflict situations 
lies in the probable weakness of governments in transition.  
 
Performance-based partnership agreements have been tried in Afghanistan and 
Cambodia as a means to bridge the resources of NGOs with government-established 
policies and regulations through contractual agreements. In principle, the government 
retains control of policy and planning but does not actually provide services. Rather, 
NGOs bid for contracts to implement a basic health services package determined by the 
government. A potential drawback of PPAs is that if NGOs are not covering all 
geographic locations in a country then the basic health services package will remain 
inaccessible to some populations. Another potential pitfall is that donors may bypass 
government completely and entered directly into contracts with NGOs. This occurred in 
Cambodia in the early 1990s, resulting in relatively heavy investment into NGO 
infrastructure without government oversight, and subsequent funding constraints for 
health ministry programmes. 
5.2  Political commitment by government 
The commitment of post-conflict governments to develop a coordinated plan for health 
sector development, and to implement this plan, greatly affects donors’ intentions and 
the long-term cohesiveness of health sector rehabilitation. A country’s ability to 
effectively manage external assistance depends partly on the existence of an articulated 
national health policy strategy, into which donors are willing to integrate in order to 
guarantee equity and promote efficiency. Mozambique attracted coordinated donor   14
support by developing a health policy formulation before the signing of the peace 
agreement (Pavignani and Colombo 2001). 
 
Following the Second World War, the transitional Japanese government made a strong 
political commitment to the health sector as part of its plan to rebuild the country 
(Yoshimura  2002). This commitment—manifested by a willingness to promote 
legislation and major public health programmes—was greatly facilitated by the fact that 
the pre-conflict condition of the health system was relatively strong and the fact that 
there was a broad consensus in Japanese society supporting rehabilitation efforts. More 
recently, Croatia, Kosovo, and East Timor have all demonstrated strong commitments to 
post-conflict health sector rehabilitation. Afghanistan hopes to follow in their footsteps. 
Afghanistan’s Interim National Health Policy 2002-04 foresees a principal role for the 
health ministry in terms of ‘stewardship of the health sector by the health ministry to 
ensure transparency, accountability, advocacy, and regulation, demonstrating 
commitment to long-term cohesion of a national framework for the health system’ 
(Transitional Islamic Government of Afghanistan 2003).  
5.3  Partnerships with NGOs 
Related to political commitment, the ability of a government to enter in active 
partnership agreements with NGOs can strongly influence the success of health sector 
rehabilitation. In Kosovo in 1999 no single authority or agency had sufficient capacity 
to single-handedly design a public health infrastructure and disease surveillance system. 
As a result, the WHO, the International Rescue Committee (IRC), and the Kosovar 
Institute of Public Health (IPH) designed the ‘Epidemic Prevention and Preparedness’ 
(EPP) Programme to enhance the capacity of the IPH to reduce mortality and morbidity 
related to infectious diseases. The EPP Programme was a concerted effort combining 
the Kosovo IPH, a multilateral organization (WHO), and an NGO (the IRC) in 
rehabilitating the public health infrastructure to promote sustainability and government 
ownership of the disease surveillance mechanism. The success of the EPP depended on 
clearly-defined roles and responsibilities, communication among partners, and 
especially the early and sustained involvement of local IPH authorities despite their lack 
of technical and human resource capacity (Brennan et al. 2001). 
 
As an alternative mechanism for collaborating with NGOs, Cambodia and now 
Afghanistan have implemented performance-based partnership agreements (PPAs). The 
PPA arrangement allows the government to take advantage of the presence and 
capacities of NGOs in an environment in which the capacity of the MOH to directly 
deliver services is currently very limited. By contracting with NGOs to deliver an 
agreed-upon package of services, the government should be able to focus more on 
management, policy, and financing mechanisms, with a particular focus on equity and 
quality. As stated earlier, however, PPAs are only likely to be effective if governments 
maintain an active role in the management of the agreements rather than being left as a 
third party as international donors collaborate separately with NGOs.   15
5.4  Prioritization, planning, and integration 
Post-conflict health sector rehabilitation is an effort to maximize positive outcomes with 
constrained resources—as such, the rehabilitation process implies a prioritization 
process for the allocation of resources. This prioritization can be based on the cost-
effectiveness of health care services, equity in access to services, or a range of other 
criteria. In addition to choosing among different types of health services and—
potentially—different population groups, post-conflict governments and donors must 
make allocation decisions related to human resource capacity development—for 
example the level of resources to devote to management training and medical education. 
 
Clearly, resource allocation decisions should be based on local realities; there is no 
universally correct approach to resource allocation. Nonetheless, approaches that favour 
equity, cost-effectiveness, and integration of services are more likely to engender 
successful rehabilitation of the health sector in the long run. Mozambique’s health plan 
strategies in the latter half of the 1990s followed sound allocation methodologies. These 
plans, amounting to $355 million over five years, stressed the following priorities: 
 
•  Health care delivery—including rehabilitation of infrastructure and equipment, 
and maintenance of services. 
•  Human resources development—focusing on training and providing liveable 
wages to government health workers. 
•  Institutional development—including decentralization, strengthening 
management capacities, and development of information systems. 
 
Uganda in the 1980s provides an example of less desirable resource allocation patterns, 
depending heavily on vertical programmes, capital investments, and tertiary care. 
Although the physical health infrastructure was improved and immunization coverage 
increased, the negative consequences of Uganda’s approach were substantial. The 
vertical programmes addressed neither capacity building for personnel nor the 
integration of disease-specific priorities into the overall health system. Of the $202 
million allocated in the national plan for health sector rehabilitation, nearly half was 
dedicated to infrastructure, including hospital rehabilitation and construction. The 
majority of the remaining funds were directed toward the restoration of vertical 
programmes for immunization and essential drug lists. This plan was capital intensive, 
and implied significant increases in recurrent expenditures in the future, far exceeding 
Uganda’s financial capabilities and threatening sustainability (Macrae et al. 1996).2 
 
                                                 
2 In 1986, 41 per cent of the health sector rehabilitation budget was allocated to rebuild the teaching 
hospital in Kampala, reflecting the emphasis on urban hospitals over community and rural health centres 
(Macrae 1997).   16
Separately from prioritization, planning is also essential for health sector rehabilitation. 
In Mozambique, by 1996 health service use in rural areas had increased three-fold from 
two years earlier. The health ministry had begun to merge vertical disease programmes 
into more comprehensive programmes. Health sector planning was based on available 
epidemiologic, demographic, and health system data. An important lesson from the 
Mozambique experience with health sector rehabilitation was the willingness of the 
government and its partners to plan ahead—so that even with unforeseen political 
events there was a sense of preparedness and direction in the health system (see 
Appendix). 
 
A key component of planning is the timing of specific inputs in the rehabilitation 
process. Investing in capital, such as construction of health facilities, without sufficient 
information about the health status and needs of the population can perpetuate existing 
inequalities and neglect new health demands. Not investing early enough in components 
such as human resource development and management skills may jeopardize the long-
term sustainability of the health system, or create a vacuum of capacity and 
accountability. Integration of health services is closely related to both prioritization for 
resource allocation and planning for implementation. In a post-conflict situation with 
little credible central authority, donors are likely to favour funding vertical projects 
running parallel to a weakened health system. Integrating these projects within the 
health system—and furthermore integrating disease programmes within the health 
system—is likely to produce better long-term results.  
 
The different partners involved in rehabilitating the health sector in East Timor strongly 
favoured integration over vertical programmes. With the government, they developed 
district health plans designed to comprehensively meet the basic health needs of the 
population (Waldman 2003). The integration of public health priorities in East Timor 
was greatly facilitated by the establishment of an Interim Health Authority (IHA) in 
2000. The IHA became the Department of Health Services (DHS), established a 
national health policy strategy and preventive public health programmes, and reached 
agreements with NGOs for in each district to formalize standards (Tulloch et al. 2003).  
5.5 Sustainability 
One of the most formidable challenges in rehabilitating the health sector is the 
consideration of the long-term sustainability of current investments. There is a 
temptation and tendency to invest heavily in reconstruction of health facility 
structures—but post-conflict governments and societies may well not have the financial 
resources to pay the recurrent costs of maintaining and operating new health 
infrastructure, particularly large hospitals. Likewise, vertical disease control 
programmes—such as the Expanded Programme on Immunizations (EPI) and Control 
of Diarrhoeal Diseases (CDD) programme—are popular and achieve noticeable results 
in the short-term. Unfortunately, vertical programmes do less to address underlying 
deficiencies in financing and management.    17
A third potential obstacle to long-term sustainability relates to the private and non-
governmental sector—when public capacity is in turmoil, private provision increases 
and public health workers and managers move to the private sector or to NGOs. While 
these developments may strengthen NGOs and lead to short-run improvements in 
performance, they are not compatible with the long-term development of an integrated 
and operational national health system (Macrae 1997). 
5.6  Other policy issues  
Finding the appropriate role for the private sector in post-conflict health sector 
rehabilitation is often a delicate issue. Private providers may have continued to function 
during the conflict; harnessing their energy and resources and bringing them into an 
integrated public-private service delivery mix is a considerable challenge in many post-
conflict settings.  
 
Incorporating women in the earliest phases of the health sector rehabilitation is crucial, 
as they have likely been marginalized from public and civic life, yet are often the eyes 
and ears of families and communities. Particularly in countries like Afghanistan, the 
health care system has discriminated against women, both in terms of their role as 
health care professionals and in terms of service delivery. Including women in policy 
discussions and human resource development will provide more opportunities to ensure 
a distribution of resources that will be accessible to, and used by, women and their 
children. 
6 Conclusions 
The success of the post-conflict health sector rehabilitation programmes is difficult to 
evaluate. These programmes are dependent on external factors—including military 
security and supportive political processes. In addition, there are a range of factors that 
influence health status that are outside of the immediate scope of a health sector 
rehabilitation programme—including poverty alleviation, economic growth, 
transportation, and water and sanitation infrastructure. Success also depends on local 
commitment and capacities—including human resource and supervision capacities, and 
the availability of data to guide decision-making. Although each post-conflict situation 
is unique, there are some valuable lessons from experiences to date.  
 
Inevitably, reconstruction is both more difficult and more costly than anticipated. Even 
if there is no reoccurrence of conflict or instability, the conflict and its reverberations 
will have shifted some needs and produced new ones (Pavignani 2002). Recognizing 
that neither universal nor quick solutions to health sector reconstruction exist is 
important for setting realistic goals and timeframes.  
 
The success stories, particularly Mozambique, Kosovo, and (to date) Afghanistan share 
in common the development of a clear national strategy to guide health system   18
development—a strategy that sets long-term priorities and allows for the integration of 
donor inputs. A national strategy for health systems development should encourage 
participation of a range of stakeholders (Keane 1996). Among these stakeholders, health 
care professionals should be consulted on both the immediate health needs of the 
population as well as longer-term policies. Appealing to the maximum number of actors 
to ensure buy-in will facilitate the implementation of the strategy, but will also lessen 
pressure on the incoming government to enforce the plan. The process of developing 
such a strategy should begin as early as possible as a country transitions from conflict to 
relative peace (Pavignani 2002). Within three months of the end of war in 1999, Kosovo 
had already adopted an interim health policy strategy, developed by the WHO in 
consultation with the Kosovar medical community (LSHTM 2001).  
 
The importance of donor coordination is difficult to underemphasize. As much as 
possible, donor inputs should be integrated into a long-term comprehensive health 
sector strategy rather than operating parallel to the government through vertical 
programmes. Maximizing the impact of external assistance also depends on the 
absorptive capacity of the existing health system. Typically the initial post-conflict 
period sees temporary economic growth spurt attributable to the inflow of aid. However, 
the capacity of post-conflict governments to effectively channel the flows of aid into 
appropriate development strategies is limited—leading to the counterintuitive 
suggestion that external assistance should start modestly and increase, rather than 
decrease, over time as part of a coordinated development process. 
 
Short-term relief and assistance programmes should be implemented in a manner 
compatible with longer-term health system rehabilitation. The three approaches to 
health sector rehabilitation outlined in this paper—(1) an initial response to immediate 
health needs; (2) the restoration or establishment of a package of essential health 
services; and (3) rehabilitation of the health system itself—should operate 
synergistically and as part of a continuum.   19
Appendix 
Country examples 
This Appendix highlights different experiences in post-conflict health system 
rehabilitation, illustrating specific approaches in different countries.  
Japan: an historical perspective  
Although the nature of contemporary conflicts has changed since the Second World 
War, Japan offers a useful point of comparison for post-conflict health system 
reconstruction. The Second World War devastated the country, both through direct war 
damage and through secondary effects including unemployment, and reduced 
agricultural output and consequent food shortages. In 1945, Japan had endured 14 years 
of war. The country lay in ruins, with over three million dead (Powers 2001). The public 
sanitation systems in several cities were destroyed, leading to increases in 
communicable diseases (Ministry of Health and Welfare 2004). 
 
To address the nutritional problems stemming from food shortages, in 1945 the post-
war transitional government carries out a national nutrition survey, assigned 
nutritionists to health centres, and implemented a Nutrition Improvement Law calling 
for nutrition counsellors to offer nutritional guidance and supporting  a school lunch 
programme. Benefits were provided to poor farmers under the Rural Life Extension 
Services act. Two laws aimed to stem the increase in communicable diseases. The 
Communicable Disease Prevention Law encouraged community efforts to organize 
vector control; the 1948 Preventive Vaccination Law required immunizations for six 
diseases. Additionally, national subsidies supported municipal public water supply 
projects in municipalities, and a surveillance system was established to track sources 
and routes of infection (ibid.). In terms of regulation and health care delivery, the 1947 
Medical Service Law set requirements for medical facilities, based on evidence-based 
medical care, and set minimum qualifications for medical personnel.  
 
A decade after the end of the Second World War, Japan was experiencing rapid 
economic growth—particularly in manufacturing—driven by a dynamic private sector, 
high savings ratios, the willingness of banks to support industry, and macroeconomic 
measures to curb inflation. With the exception of South Korea, such dynamic growth 
has rarely been seen in post-conflict situations since. In most countries plagued by 
contemporary conflict, the capacity for economic development has been impaired for 
much longer (Yoshimura 2002).  
 
Important factors underlying the success of Japan’s health system reconstruction were 
social solidarity; exemplary political leadership; assistance from the international   20
community in restructuring and democratization; and financial support from the IMF 
and the World Bank following the Bretton Woods conference. Perhaps even more 
important was the state of Japan before the Second World War—with a relatively 
egalitarian distribution of wealth compared to nations afflicted by conflict today. Also, 
from the time reconstruction began, the Japanese government made strong political 
commitments to the health and education sectors in an effort to restore Japan back to its 
earlier stature (Yoshimura 2002).  
 
Over fifty years ago, Japan had an approach to the reconstruction of its health system 
that is rarely seen in current efforts. This approach featured a strong political 
commitment and prioritization of the health and education sectors, manifested by a 
willingness to promote legislation and major public health programmes. This 
commitment was greatly facilitated by the fact that the pre-conflict condition of the 
health system was relatively strong—and the fact that there was a broad consensus in 
Japanese society supporting rehabilitation efforts. 
East Timor: a sector-wide approach 
In August 1999 the majority of East Timor’s population chose independence from 
Indonesia in a popular referendum organized by the UN. The referendum was followed 
by months of violence, looting, and destruction by pro-Indonesian factions. Ensuing 
riots compounded the destruction. Health indicators, never as good as the rest of 
Indonesia, had been worsened by the conflict. The East Timor health system, even 
before the disturbances, was chronically under-funded and highly-centralized. Public 
subsidies were not targeted towards the poor. East Timor was heavily dependent on 
donor support (Tulloch et al. 2003). 
 
East Timor used a sector-wide approach in its Health Sector Rehabilitation and 
Development Programme Sector, a critical move for cooperation between the UN 
Transitional Authority for East Timor (UNTAET), NGOs, and bilateral and 
international organizations. Instead of vertical projects running parallel to a weakened 
health system, East Timor developed district health plans, with the hopes that these 
would be more sustainable and meet the basic health needs of the entire population 
better than patchwork programmes and projects scattered across the country (Waldman 
2003). 
 
In 2000, the UNTAET established a central health authority—the Interim Health 
Authority—(IHA) to design a Health Sector Rehabilitation and Development 
Programme with the goal of an integrated public health management system. The 
objective of Phase I of this programme was to allow NGOs to continue providing 
essential services while the IHA prepared for longer-term investments in the health 
system. During Phase II, the IHA became the Department of Health Services (DHS) and 
established a national health policy strategy and preventive public health programmes.   21
Also during this phase, the DHS reached agreements with NGOs for each district to 
formalize district standards (Tulloch et al. 2003). In 2001, Phase III saw the Health 
ministry assume financing responsibilities in most districts and begin to recruit health 
professionals from those same NGOs. In the final phase of the health system recovery, 
in late 2001, the NGOs withdrew from the districts—leaving the management of all 
health facilities to the Health ministry (Rohland and Cliffe 2002). 
 
The objectives of this health sector rehabilitation programme were based on the 
fundamental goal of ‘… address[ing] immediate basic health needs of the population of 
East Timor and develop[ing] health policies and health system appropriate to the 
country’ (Tulloch et al. 2003). The main approach to reach this goal was to promote 
access to basic package of health services, and to restore fundamental components of 
the health system. These components were defined as: a pharmaceutical logistics 
system; reconstructed and re-equipped health centres; a referral system; administrative 
infrastructure; and a small grant scheme to support involvement by communities and 
stakeholders. By stressing these fundamentals, the programme aimed to lay the 
foundation for future health policies and the development of a cohesive health system 
(Tulloch et al. 2003). 
 
Reconstruction of the East Timor health system encountered a series of challenges—
including competing objectives and expectations of donors, stakeholders, and 
politicians; the timely procurement of quality goods and supplies; levels of funding in 
excess of absorptive capacity; and very strict procurement procedures—leaving little 
flexibility for short-term funding reallocation. There were discrepancies in the priorities, 
timelines, and reporting formats among organizations. International organizations bid 
against each other for qualified personnel, who were often recruited from local 
organizations. 
 
Despite these challenges—common to most post-conflict settings—East Timor has 
realized considerable achievements in restoring its health system. By late 2001 the East 
Timor Health ministry was in place, with over 800 staff recruited and in the field. A 
central pharmacy had constructed; most essential drugs were available by the central 
health authority. Twenty-two new health centres had been constructed. A household 
survey for health and health care was nearly complete. The National Tuberculosis 
Programme and the Integrated Management of Childhood Illnesses programme were re-
established, and there were projects underway to address reproductive health, 
HIV/AIDS, and mental health. Moreover, there was a sense of collaboration by the 
organizations involved. Most importantly, the Central Health Authority had credibility 
in the local and international community as the principal authority for the health sector 
reconstruction (Tulloch et al. 2003). 
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Mozambique: the importance of planning 
After thirty years of conflict—first with Portugal and later between the government and 
the South-African backed resistance movement Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana 
(RENAMO)—Mozambique celebrated a peace agreement in 1992. The agreement also 
marked the beginning of the rehabilitation of the health sector. By the mid-1980s the 
National Health Service had become heavily dependent on external aid. Nearly 60 per 
cent of the national budget came from donor funds. A large proportion of international 
aid bypassed the government entirely and went straight to NGOs. The health sector was 
on emergency footing for the last part of the war with RENAMO—with uncoordinated 
inputs, inefficient programmes, and declining health status indicators (Pavignani and 
Durao 1999). 
 
In the early 1990s the health ministry, anticipating peace in the near future, developed 
an ambitious plan for the transition into peace. This was plan was succeeded by a health 
plan for the time period 1996-2001 with a $355 million budget and the following 
priorities (Keane 1996): 
 
(1)  Health care delivery—rehabilitation of equipment and infrastructure, maintenance 
of services. 
(2)  Human resources development—training, wage increases, and other support. 
(3)  Institutional development—management capacity, investment in information 
systems, and decentralization. 
 
However, the transition from conflict to peace—from 1993 to 1995—was much harder 
than anticipated. Progress was slow and expensive, and as displaced populations 
returned home or settled in new areas, new strains on the health system resulted in 
delays in the expansion of the health care delivery. The reconstruction of primary health 
care infrastructure was beset by obstacles related to uncoordinated investments. There 
was a tension between a realistic approach to policy discussion—acknowledging 
capacity limitations and insufficient resources—and a more ambitious approach 
emphasizing the need for progress (Pavignani and Durao 1999).  
 
By 1996, health service use in rural areas had increased three fold from two years earlier 
and the democratically elected government installed in 1994 had continued the health 
sector rehabilitation plans of the successor government. By the mid 1990s, the health 
ministry had begun to merge vertical disease programmes into more comprehensive 
programmes. Health sector planning was based on available epidemiologic, 
demographic, and health system data. Perhaps the most important lesson from the 
Mozambique experience was the willingness of the government and its partners to plan 
ahead—so that even with unforeseen political events there was a sense of preparedness 
and direction in the health system. 
 
   23
Afghanistan: performance-based partnership agreements 
Afghanistan, much in the international spotlight due to its transition into the post-
conflict phase following twenty years of conflict and the end of Taliban rule, will offer 
substantial insight into approaches to health sector rehabilitation. With health indicators 
among the worst in the world, Afghanistan only has room for improvement. During 
twenty years of conflict, Soviet occupation, and civil war, Afghanistan’s health system 
had deteriorated so severely that when the Taliban collapsed in 2001 the health system 
was almost non-existent.  
 
In 2002 a joint donor mission issued an aide memoir with a very strong public health 
emphasis, recognizing the substantial limitations of the government to provide health 
services and recommending strong relationships with the private sector through 
Performance-based Partnership Agreements (PPAs) in which the government would 
contract to the private non-profit sector for health care delivery. The donor mission—
composed of representatives from WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA, and bilateral 
organizations—found that most health centres were in urban areas and that there were 
overstaffed centres without appropriate training and policies, and recommended 
eliminating user fees as there were no mechanisms to guarantee equity and 
transparency. Investments in maternal and child health care were of paramount 
importance, since much the mortality and morbidity in these populations could be 
prevented through the provision of basic health care services and preventive measures 
(Waldman and Hanif 2002). 
 
Through the PPA scheme, Afghanistan has focused heavily on the restoration—or initial 
implementation—of a Basic Health Services Package (BSHP). The BHSP is defined to 
include adequately trained health personnel, offering a core package of services made 
widely available, rather than a more comprehensive package available to a select few. It 
is also defined in function of levels of care, ranging from community health workers to 
referral systems in secondary and tertiary settings. The BHSP requires corresponding 
investments in community education, and its effectiveness will depend on operational 
research, health information systems, and programme management and coordination. 
 
Afghanistan’s Interim National Health Policy 2002-04 foresees a principal role for the 
Health ministry in terms of ‘stewardship of the health sector by the health ministry to 
ensure transparency, accountability, advocacy, and regulation, demonstrating 
commitment to long-term cohesion of a national framework for the health system’ 
(Transitional Islamic Government of Afghanistan 2003). The PPA arrangement allows 
the government to take advantage of the presence and capacities of NGOs in an 
environment in which the capacity of the MOH to directly deliver services is currently 
very limited. By contracting with NGOs to deliver an agreed-upon package of services, 
the government should be able to focus more on management, policy, and financing 
mechanisms, with a particular focus on equity and quality. 
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Afghanistan’s health sector development plan lays out short, medium, and long-term 
goals. Short-term goals include the establishment of a national immunization 
programme—with 90 per cent measles vaccination coverage and 40 per cent 
immunization coverage of the full Expanded Programme on Immunizations (EPI) for 
children; supplementary and therapeutic feeding programmes to address urgent 
problems of malnutrition, the implementation of a basic health services package, and 
refresher training for health care personnel. Intermediate goals, within a 3 year horizon, 
include reducing the infant mortality rate (IMR) to 140 per 1,000; increasing EPI 
coverage to 50%; eradicating polio and measles; further reducing the prevalence and 
incidence of acute malnutrition; increasing tetanus toxoid coverage for pregnant 
women; and undertaking comprehensive training for female health personnel in an 
effort to address gender issues as important public health interventions. Within 10 years, 
appropriate public health actions could deliver the essential basic health services 
package to the entire population; reduce the IMR to 85 per 1,000 live births; reduce the 
Maternal Mortality Rate (MMR) by 50 per cent to 850 per 100,000 births; and reduce 
the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) to between 5 and 6 children per married woman (UNDP 
2002).  
 
Afghanistan has begun its health system reconstruction early and actively, with 
substantial support from the international community and a commitment to restore basic 
health services while also addressing importance of management and health policy. 
Given the state of the health system inherited from decades of conflict, Afghanistan is 
essentially starting from scratch, but has indicated clear goals for the immediate, 
medium- and long-term.  
Kosovo: a collaborative effort to restore public health infrastructure 
The war in Kosovo in 1999—with a resulting flood of refugees and internally displaced 
persons (IDPs)—placed serious pressures on new country’s public health system. 
Health system infrastructure itself was damaged; and disease surveillance capacity and 
epidemic preparedness weakened. Additionally, the post-conflict health system faced 
significant challenges. The health system before the conflict had been centralized—
based heavily on specialist care, vertical programmes, and predominantly government 
employees. The ethnic repression and discrimination of the previous decade had 
manifested in development of the parallel and separate health systems (Shuey et al. 
2003). 
 
No single authority or agency within Kosovo had sufficient capacity to single-handedly 
design a public health infrastructure and disease surveillance system. As a result, the 
WHO, the International Rescue Committee (IRC), and the Kosovar Institute of Public 
Health (IPH) designed the ‘Epidemic Prevention and Preparedness’ (EPP) Programme 
to enhance the capacity of the IPH to reduce mortality and morbidity related to   25
infectious diseases—a severe problem following the conflict and a high priority 
identified by the Kosovar officials (Brennan et al. 2001). 
 
In the absence of public health surveillance, epidemiological tracking, and a health 
information system, the post-conflict effort to control infectious disease was 
challenging. Estimates and history suggested high risks for typhoid, hemorrhagic fevers, 
hepatitis A, and tuberculosis. The conditions for all of these diseases were worsened by 
the disruption of sanitary sources, contaminated water supply, and migrating 
populations. 
 
The EPP programme began by conducting a country-wide baseline health survey for 
both ethnic Albanian and Serb populations. The second component of the EPP was the 
standardization of healthcare definitions and cost-effective case-management protocols 
for subsequent distribution to all levels of the health care system. Third, the EPP 
installed a public health surveillance system, including adequately trained 
epidemiologists, microbiologists, and managers. The fourth component was the 
rehabilitation of microbiology laboratories to improve diagnostic testing and increase 
efficiency. These four components were complemented by community-based public 
health education and promotion campaigns through the media and health professionals. 
The final piece of the EPP Programme was to create, at the regional level, epidemic 
response teams with training in outbreak investigation, epidemiological studies, and 
information management (Brennan et al. 2001).  
 
Kosovo presents a unique experience, in that the EPP Programme was a concerted effort 
combining the Kosovo IPH, a multilateral organization (the WHO), and an NGO (the 
IRC) in rehabilitating the public health infrastructure to promote sustainability and 
government ownership of the disease surveillance mechanism. The success of the EPP 
depended on clearly-defined roles and responsibilities, communication among partners, 
the early and sustained involvement of local IPH authorities despite their lack of 
technical and human resource capacity, and flexibility in objectives (Brennan et al. 
2001). 
Uganda: a lack of prioritization 
The most salient feature of Uganda’s approach to the reconstruction of its health system 
was the lack of priority given to the health sector in overall national rehabilitation plans. 
Repressive regimes and political factionalism had marked Uganda’s history since 
independence in 1962. When the National Resistance Movement (NRM), under Yoweri 
Musevini, took power in 1986, there was a period of peace, offering an opportunity for 
transition from conflict and to development. 
 
Unfortunately, health was not prominent in the NMR’s early political agenda. The new 
government assumed that rebuilding infrastructure and promoting economic growth   26
would by themselves ultimately lead to social development and health improvements. 
The NMR established executive secretaries for most other sectors but did not include 
the health sector as a priority focus for rehabilitation. This neglect of thoughtful policy 
development and sector reconstruction would prove to be detrimental to Uganda’s post-
conflict health system.  
 
Until the 1970s, the Ugandan population enjoyed better health status than its African 
neighbours, but the cumulative effect of political instability and conflict dropped 
Uganda to a ranking of 40th in terms of public heath status among African countries. 
Infant mortality rates increased between the 1970s and 1980s, as did the burden of 
communicable diseases including malaria, tuberculosis, and measles, and HIV (Macrae 
et al. 1996). The national health system, centred on urban care and curative models, 
failed to address the needs of the rural populations. By the mid-1980s the health system 
was starved of financing. In 1986/87, the health ministry budget was just 6.4 per cent of 
its 1970 amount in real terms—in part due to increases in military spending, not atypical 
of conflict and post-conflict situations. Public spending on health was less than 0.1 per 
cent of GDP (ibid.).  
 
In addition to the financing consequences, conflict had also devastated the human 
resource base in the health sector, thereby undermining potential policy development. 
The physical infrastructure also suffered from the decades of conflict. As the public 
health system deteriorated, the private sector partially filled the void, attracting public 
employees with the prospect of payments supplementary to their normal salary. This 
change in the balance between public and private healthcare provision exacerbated the 
existing fragmentation in health service delivery. 
 
The approach to post-conflict health system reconstruction in Uganda was oriented 
towards rebuilding infrastructure rather than system reforms. In the 1986 $202 million 
national plan for health sector rehabilitation, nearly half was dedicated to infrastructure, 
hospital rehabilitation, and a teaching hospital. Of the other $111 million designated, the 
majority was directed toward the restoration of vertical programmes for immunization 
and essential drug lists. The plan was capital intensive, implying significant increases in 
recurrent expenditures into the future that exceeded Uganda’s financial capabilities 
(Macrae et al. 1996). 
 
Beyond the emphasis on the physical reconstruction of the health sector, the 
rehabilitation plan for the health sector in Uganda had other weaknesses. The 
government assumed responsibility to finance rehabilitation of the secondary and 
tertiary levels, and left the primary health care level to the hands of the non-
governmental sector—leading to parallel systems and fragmentation. On the positive 
side, much of the physical health infrastructure was improved, immunization coverage 
increased dramatically, and the essential drugs programme was operating smoothly. 
However, the negative consequences of Uganda’s approach were substantial. The   27
vertical programmes addressed neither capacity building for personnel nor the 
integration of disease-specific priorities into the overall health system. In the absence of 
a national policy, donors operated according to their respective agendas, and assumed 
the role of resource allocation. The resulting patchwork in projects and services, through 
vertical programmes, the private sector, and the non-governmental community 
undermined the possibility of a more comprehensive national health policy. Although 
there was a commitment by the NMR and the donor community to rehabilitate the 
health sector, both parties disproportionately focused on rebuilding infrastructure at the 
expense of long-term health policy objectives. 
Cambodia: coordinating external aid 
Cambodia’s post-conflict health sector rehabilitation underscores the importance of the 
role of external aid and efforts to coordinate international assistance. Since 
independence in 1954, Cambodia has depended heavily on foreign aid. During the Cold 
War, regime changes dictated whether aid came from the West and or the East 
(Lanjouw et al. 1999). After the Cold War, international aid continued to pour into 
Cambodia, usually bypassing the central government which was frequently changing 
and plagued with factionalism.  
 
In 1988, a large portion of a $10 million package for relief and development was 
programmed for the health sector, with delivery through existing NGOs. By 1992 over 
$28 million was channelled to the health sector through 55 NGOs (Lanjouw et al. 1998 
and 1999). Despite anticipated peace in the early 1990s and elections in 1993, 
international agencies were tentative in engaging with the government given the lack of 
a coherent national strategy and political factionalism. Still, international aid accounted 
for a considerably greater portion of health expenditures than did the government. In 
1993, international aid represented $4.40 in per capita health spending, compared to less 
than $1.00 in spending on health by the government (Lanjouw et al. 1998; World Bank 
2004).  
 
There have been several attempts to coordinate donor assistance. In 1989 a number of 
NGOs established an informal coordinating mechanism, MEDICAM, to develop 
relationships with the MOH. Two years later, when the UN Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia (UNTAC) was established as an interim authority but lacked authority to 
allocate revenues. Donors bypassed the regime and entered directly into contracts with 
NGOs, the number of which had nearly doubled during 1991-93. One result was that 
there was relatively heavy investment into infrastructure in the health sector, while 
programmes and activities were under-funded. 
 
In 1991, the World Health Organization supported an effort by the health ministry to 
coordinate efforts and resources within the health sector. The resulting Coordinating 
Committee for Health was chaired by the Undersecretary of Health within UNTAC with   28
representatives from the Health ministry, WHO, UNICEF, ICRC, UNDP, bilateral 
agencies and three NGOs. The objectives of the Committee were to monitor and 
evaluate health activities by international aid agencies; provide technical advice; and 
make recommendations to the Health ministry to support planning, coordination, and 
implementation of health sector policies and programmes. The idea was also to ensure 
the sharing and evaluation of health system information to collectively identify 
priorities and limitations (Lanjouw et al. 1998, 1999). 
 
Both the MEDICAM and the Coordinating Committee efforts were more effective in 
sharing information than in actual implementation of compliance based on national 
health policy—partly because they both lacked political authority, and partly because 
donor agencies continued to negotiate separately with political factions and with NGOs, 
based on geographical location and their own respective agendas. 
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